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POLICY, PROLIFERATION AND THE NPT:
U.S. STRATEGIES AND SOUTH
ASIAN PROSPECTS
JOANNE FINEGAN

The spread, or proliferation, of nuclear weapons technology and
capability, while not a new issue, has in recent years become more of
a threat to world stability than ever before. Since the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) took effect nine years
ago, the specter of proliferation has grown, not diminished, and has
become a reality in India, and perhaps elsewhere. This global issue is
compounded by the political, military, economic, and technological
complexities of the status of nuclear development. Strict adherence to
the NPT is a necessary prerequisite to discouraging weapons
production, but even parties to the Treaty have disagreed as to its
interpretations and obligations, creating gaps in policy capable of
exploitation not only by non-nuclear-weapon states but also by those
states with weapons capability. Also, the failure of certain strategic
states to conform to the spirit and letter of the Treaty has obviated it
as the single definitive means to non-proliferation.
For the 109 states which have signed the Treaty, though, the
obligation not to contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons is
a legal one.
This paper will examine the legal obligations of parties to the
NPT - those of weapons states and non-nuclear states. The
interpretations of these obligations by the states themselves will be
analyzed. The case of India will be explored, particularly as it relates
to criticisms of the NPT by states which have not become parties. The
capability and motivation behind a threshold country's decision to "go
nuclear" will be reviewed, with emphasis on the process of proliferation under which India proceeded. U.S. non-proliferation policy will
be analyzed, from a historical standpoint and also in light of its most
recent non-proliferation efforts. The prospects for Pakistan as a
threshold state will be discussed with respect to its particular
motivations and apparent directions. Finally, recommendations
directed toward steps which can help ensure that the purposes of the
Treaty are realized will be presented, focusing on the development of
United States policy as a supplier state, and as the foremost
proponent of nuclear development in the world.

(1)
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I. International legal obligations of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty
International efforts to restrict nuclear energy to peaceful
purposes have taken several forms: bilateral and multilateral
treaties, international organizations such as the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), arms limitations negotiations, and export
policy accords between major suppliers. The cornerstone of these
efforts is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(Non-Proliferation Treaty)/ which presently has 109 signatories.
Through the work of the IAEA a safeguards system has been
established whereby any country may voluntarily submit to inspections, audits, facility design approval and deposit of nuclear materials
with the IAEA. The NPT complements the IAEA structure by
imposing treaty obligations on non-nuclear-weapons states to accept
safeguards, and by prohibiting the transfer of special fissionable
material (i.e. plutonium) to any non-nuclear-weapons state without
IAEA safeguards. Within this international framework for proliferation control, however, there are no sanctions against violators who
divert nuclear material to a military purpose, other than announcement to the world community after detection of such violations. 2
Despite these and other shortcomings of the Treaty, it remains the
most comprehensive of efforts to retard proliferation.
Legislative history. Much of the substance of the NPT can be
traced to a resolution adopted unanimously by the United Nations
General Assembly on December 4, 1961. 3 This resolution called on all
states, particularly those possessing nuclear weapons, to conclude an
international agreement under which nuclear states would refrain
from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons or transmitting
essential information to non-nuclear states, and non-nuclear states
would refrain from attempting the manufacture or control of such
weapons. As of that date, there were four states possessing nuclear
weapons: the United States (1945), the USSR (1949), the United
Kingdom (1952) and France (1960). 4 The emphasis of this resolution
was on the non-transfer of control over nuclear weapons, retaining, at
1. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Atomic Weapons, 1 July 1968 [1970]. UST
483, T.I.A.S. # 6839. The treaty appears in Appendix A.
2. Gleissner, J.D. Recent US efforts to control nuclear proliferation. 10 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 271, 276 (1977).
3. NRes/1665 (XVI) Dec. 5, 1961; Documents on Disarmament, 1961, at 694.
4. Epstein, W. Why states go - and don't go - nuclear. 430 Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 16, 18 (March, 1977).
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least implicitly, the possibility of transfer of possession for strategic
alliance purposes.
The United States and the USSR were the primary negotiators in
the implementation of the 1961 resolution. Their initial efforts
produced a "Joint Statement of Agreed Principles" for conducting
multilateral negotiations on disarmament, and two agenda items for
discussion in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC):
reducing the risk of war through accident, miscalculation, or lack of
communication, and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. 5
The ENDC was a joint creation of the two superpowers,
established subsequent to the General Assembly resolution as a
forum for discussion of an international proliferation agreement. It
was composed of five NATO members (Canada, France, Great
Britain, Italy and the United States); five Warsaw Pact members
(Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, and the Soviet Union);
and eight non-aligned states (Brazil, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India,
Mexico, Nigeria, and Sweden). 6 The adopted procedure was the
presentation of separate draft treaties by the U.S. and the USSR,
with discussion of disparities and compromises taking place within
the ENDC, NATO, and the General Assembly. The resulting treaty
was commended by resolution of the General Assembly on June 12,
1968. 7 The treaty entered into force in March, 1970, in accordance
with paragraph three of Article IX of the Treaty.
The success of the Treaty depends on several factors. The effect of
some contingencies are not capable of ready determination; for
example, changes in the development of the world political situation,
and the success of the two nuclear superpowers in limiting their arms
race. Other factors will have a much more decisive impact on the
Treaty's success: the willingness of the parties to strictly adhere to its
tenets, and the balancing of obligations to make the Treaty more
acceptable to certain states which have so far refused to accede to the
Treaty.

5. Willrich, M. Non-Proliferation Treaty: Framework for Nuclear Arms Control,
The Mitchie Company, Charlottesville, VA, at 62 (1969).
6. 16 U.N. GAOR 1129, A/Res/1722 (XVI), Jan. 3, 1962; Documents on
Disarmament, 1962, at 741. Although France was nominally a part of the ENDC, it
never took part in the proceedings.
7. A/Res/2372 (XXII), U.N. Doc. A/7016/Add. 1, at 5, June 10, 1968. Among those
abstaining from the vote were Brazil, France, India, Spain, and Argentina.
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A. Nuclear-weapons states and the Non-Proliferation Treaty
The specific obligations imposed on nuclear-weapons states are
set out in Article I of the Treaty, which prohibits among other things
transfer of nuclear weapons, "other nuclear explosive devices," and
control over such weapons and devices to non-nuclear-weapons states.
These terms, not expressly defined in the Treaty, are open to the
possibility of varying interpretations by the weapons-states parties,
particularly the USSR and the U.S.
Among the weapons states, there is virtually no disagreement as
to the meaning of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices. The
definition advanced by the United States for "nuclear weapons" is
included in the Atomic Energy Act:
Any device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive of the means for
transporting or propelling the device (where such means is a
separable and divisible part of the device) the principal purpose
of which is for use as, or development of, a weapon, a weapon
prototype, or a weapon test device. 8
The Soviet Union has generally agreed with this definition, which
excludes nuclear delivery systems, as well as propulsion elements such
as nuclear powered submarines. There has also been agreement between
the nuclear super-powers that "other nuclear explosive devices"
include the so-called "peaceful nuclear explosives" iPNEl that differ
from nuclear weapons only in intended use, not technology. The
restriction placed on the acquisition of PNEs is a major area of
contention between the riuclear-weapons states and states such as
Brazil and India, which view such a restriction as hampering
technological and economic development and relegating non-nuclear
weapon nations to permanent inferior status in their utilization of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. These arguments will be
explored in more detail as factors deterring such states from
becoming parties to the NPT.
The concept of "control" over nuclear weapons was one of the
major barriers delaying completion of NPT negotiations between the
United States and the Soviet Union. The United States, mindful of its
defense obligations under NATO, insisted that deployment of nuclear
weapons to non-nuclear weapons allies, such as West Germany, did
not entail the transfer of control as long as the weapons were legally
owned by the U.S. and remained in the physical custody of U.S.
8. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, § 11 (d), 42 U.S.C. § 2014 (d) (1964).
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armed forces. The Soviets were just as adamant that West Germany
and other European allies not have "access" to nuclear weapons. 9 The
compromise reached on this issue basically reflected the existing U.S.
policy embodied in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The NATO
defense system remained intact, and the issue of control was limited
to the concept of authority to decide the use of the nuclear weapons actual, not potential, control. 10
Another obligation imposed by Article I is the prohibition against
assisting, encouraging, or inducing any non-nuclear-weapon state to
manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons. One question repeatedly
raised during the ENDC discussions was the point at which such a
prohibitory regulation could be focused. The United States was
willing to simply prohibit manufacture; the Soviet Union draft
treaties on this point included "preparations for manufacture" among
the forms of prohibited assistance. The final agreement did not
mention preparations for manufacture, relying on the safeguards of
Article III to detect and control such preparations.
The technological advances made since the Treaty was negotiated, however, have more closely linked civil power programs with
weapons development, making it easier for non-nuclear weapons
states to move closer to weapons acquisition without deviating
noticeably from the peaceful uses limitation of the Treaty. 11 Specifically, the breeder-reactor, which creates more weapons-grade plutonium than it expends, and reprocessing plants, which allow uraniumimporters to recycle their plutonium from spent fuel rods and achieve
autonomy within a self-perpetuating fuel cycle, have blurred the line
between peaceful nuclear development and development of a weapons
option. Fuel-cycle technology is the "missing link" for many countries
in the development of an indigenous nuclear program with the
capability of weapons production.
There is yet another obligation which, while directed to all
parties to the Treaty, is aimed particularly at the nuclear weapons
states. Article VI calls on all parties to pursue negotiations in good
faith toward cessation of the nuclear arms race, and toward general
9. Statement by Soviet Union Representative to ENDC, February 17, 1966,
ENDC/PV. 241, at 24-33; Documents on Disarmament, 1966, at 24-29.
10. Willrich, M. Non-Proliferation Treaty: Framework for Nuclear Arms Control,
the Mitchie Company, Charolttesville, Va., at 76 (1969).
11. Office of Technology Assessment Report on Nuclear Proliferation Safeguards:
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Federal
Services of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 95th Congress, 1st Sess. 14
(1977) (statement of Theodore Taylor).
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and complete disarmament. With respect to the former goal, some
progress has been made; with respect to the latter, virtually none. In
moving toward resolution in these areas, it is not as important to
scrutinize the history and negotiations on the SALT talks, for
example, as it is to scrutinize the philosophy underlying the position
of the two governments involved. The main premise on which the
governments of both the U.S. and the USSR base their nuclear arms
limitation philosophy is that a nuclear stockpile is primarily for
military purposes and not for political clout. This leads each of the
two countries to conclude that a state can never have enough nuclear
weapons to maintain effective strike capabilities against the other
power. 12 It is not satisfaction with either offensive or defensive
capabilities, nor a desire for "stabilized arms control" that has led
these states to the negotiating table. Such incentives would have
resulted in the conclusion of an agreement years ago. Rather, what
has brought these two nations to accord has been the more pedestrian
matter of economics. Consider the following synopsis of a document
presented by the Russian Foreign Office:
The motives may have been selfish; the reasoning was wholly
excellent. The ever-increasing expense of armaments (so Count
Muravieff, the Russian Foreign Minister, argued) was touching
public prosperity at its very source; the intellectual and physical
powers of the people, labour, and capital, were being turned aside
from their natural functions and consumed unproductively;
hundreds of millions were being spent on engines of destruction
which, today considered as the highest triumph of science, were
destined for the rubbish-heap tomorrow, as a result of some new
discovery. The armaments of each power were increasing in size,
but they succeeded less and less in accomplishing their object, the
preservation of peace; economic crises, due largely to the expense
of excessive armaments, and the constant dangers resulting from
the accumulation of war material, made the armed peace an
overwhelming; indeed a futile, burden, since the continuation of
the race was leading inevitably to catastrophe. 13

12. Thayer, F.C. Proliferation and the future: destruction or transformation? 430
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 133, 137 (March, 1977).
13. Martin, A. Legal Aspects of Disarmament. The British Institute of International and Comparative Law, London, 1963, at 16-17. The full text of the document is
reprinted in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898, at 541-542.
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This analysis of continued stockpiling of arms is no less cogent now
than when it was first asserted as a prelude to the Hague Peace
Conference, in 1898. If anything, these arguments are even more
compelling today than they were eighty-one years ago, given the
advances in technology during the intervening years, and the rate at
which obsolescence occurs in the tactical military weapons field. The
two superpowers, however, have begun to yield to economic reality
without altering their basic perception of nuclear weapons acquisition
as primarily a military rather than a political tool.
Such an attitude is to be contrasted with that of the other nuclear
weapons states as well as with that of several of the near-nuclear
states. What has been termed "the French view" argues in effect that
nuclear weapons are basically political, or terrorist, in nature, hence
a modest nuclear force would be highly effective. To that, U.S. policy
makers and defense analysts respond that a. small force is of little
consequence precisely because it is too small to be militarily
effective. 14 Such a response assumes conclusions based on a "rational
war" scenario first promulgated by U.S. defense intellectuals to
rationalize mushrooming military budgets in a time of peace. This
scenario became popular during the late 1950's and assumed a U.S.
first strike against the U.S.S.R. aimed at Soviet missile centers, with
a "bonus effect" of substantial damage any such strike would cause to
nearby population centers. The second strike would be aimed at our
population centers, which would be evacuated in anticipation of such
retaliation. This strike would not do significant damage, it was
argued, because of the initial destruction of the opponent's weapons.
U.S. cities would be repopulated once fallout had subsided. The first
strike scenario justified the acquisition of large amounts of weapons
to destroy similarly large amounts on the Soviet side while conveniently ignoring the impossibility of total evacuation of U.S. cities.
In the 1960's an opposite approach was developed by defense
tacticians which assumed a Soviet first strike against our missile
bases. To prepare for this possibility, the prospect of evacuation of
cities was abandoned; downtown buildings were designated as
"fallout shelters" and citizens were encouraged to build bomb shelters
in suburban and rural areas for protection against the bonus effect a
first strike by the Soviets would have. The basic contradictions
between the first and second strike scenarios were never clarified;
meanwhile the missile reserves grew. Moreover, the proponents of the
14. Thayer, F.C. Proliferation and the future: destruction or transformation? 430
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 133, 137 (March, 1977).
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first and second strike theories ignored the fact that the only
offensive use of nuclear weapons to date had been directed not toward
the conventional weapons bases which a rational war first strike
assumes, but toward the Japanese population centers of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki. The terrorist nature of these attacks was not lost on
countries such as France, China and India when it came to the
development of their own nuclear strategy.
B. India and the Non-Proliferation Treaty
The case of India presents a prototype by which the motivations
and capabilities of non-nuclear-weapons states may be measured,
particularly those countries which are not signatories to the NPT and
are on the threshold of weapons proliferation. India, which had been
one of the strongest and most active proponents of non-proliferation
in the 1950's and early sixties, began to reevaluate its policy in terms
of nuclear deterrence after China exploded its first atomic bomb. 15
India was part of the ENDC which conducted the discussions on
negotiation of the Treaty, but did not become a party to the Treaty.
At the time of the ENDC Conferences, India was a non-nuclear state
beset by security problems, particularly with regard to China, which
had attacked India with conventional weapons in 1962 and which had
acquired nuclear capability by the time of the onset of the ENDC
Conferences. During the conferences, India was in vocal opposition to
inherent discrimination within the draft treaty proposals, in that
limitations were placed only on the ambitions of non-nuclear
countries and not on those of existing nuclear powers. 16 This was
partially a result of the process used by the ENDC in negotiating the
treaty. The two nuclear superpowers, the United States and the
Soviet Union, presented separate draft treaty proposals similtaneously and work within the ENDC consisted largely of give and take
between these two countries regarding their expectations and obligations, without, in India's eyes, sufficient regard to what was expected
of them in return by the non-nuclear nations. The result was a treaty
acceptable to the U.S. and the Soviet Union, but unacceptable to a
number of states, particularly those with both a substantial civil
nuclear power program and ongoing security problems. India was a

15. Epstein, W. Why states go - and don't go - nuclear. 430 Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 16, 18-19 (March, 1977).
16. Boskey, B. and Willrich, M., eds. Nuclear Proliferation: Prospects for Control.
The Dunellen Company, Inc., New York, 1970, at 30.
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member of the latter group of states at the time of its rejection of the
NPT.
India was critical both of the general assumptions underlying the
Treaty and several of its specific provisions. One general premise
underlying the NPT was the notion that the United States and the
USSR would separately agree to protect their own allies from nuclear
blackmail or attack by the other. This umbrella concept was also an
outgrowth of the military doctrine viewpoint examined above, and is
fallacious for two reasons. First, it minimizes the terrorist character
of nuclear weapons, the fact that they are most effective when used
against civilian populations. It is naive to believe that the U.S. would
jeopardize its own civilian population by putting it at the mercy of an
ally whose foreign policies are beyond U.S. control, particularly in
light of the isolationist feelings which have developed subsequent to
the Vietnam war. Furthermore, an umbrella concept defies the
established fact that countries may have permanent interests, but not
permanent allies. India, and some of the threshold countries, have
been reluctant to place their security at the mercy of one or another of
the super-powers, for nationalist reasons and in recognition of the
tenuous nature of allegiances. Prior to the adoption of the draft
treaties in the ENDC, India had demanded an adequate security
agreement, in effect a joint U.S.-Soviet guarantee, in return for
signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but it was not forthcoming. The
Soviets would not cooperate in furnishing a pointedly anti-Chinese
promise to India, and the U.S. would not consider it without an option
to be absolved of its obligation should the Soviets refuse to come to
India's aid under attack." The U.S. was also reluctant to agree to
come to India's aid, feeling that it would then be obligated to make
similar commitments to other threshold states, possibly involving the
U.S. in remote wars in which it had no vested interests.
The second fallacious premise on which the Treaty was based was
the assumption that the U.S. and the USSR would join in a military
alliance to destroy another country's attempt to develop nuclear
weapons, if other attempts at deterrence were ineffective. If the two
superpowers were serious about halting proliferation, the threat of
joint retaliation against a proliferating country would be the ultimate
deterrent. But the Soviets were already concerned about possible
Chinese reaction to a prospective alliance, and the U.S. was unwilling

17. Dougherty, J.E. The treaty and the non-nuclear states. 11 Orbis 360, 365
(1967).
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to undermine the confidence of its European allies for the sake of a

truly effective deterrent to proliferation.
To India, several specifics of the Treaty were objectionable, as
well as some of its underlying premises. India found the balance of
obligations weighted heavily to the detriment of non-nuclear-weapon
states. In that respect, attention was first drawn to Article I of the
Treaty, where three loopholes in particular were criticized. The first
was that although the nuclear-weapon states were prohibited by its
terms from transferring control over such weapons to any state, the
prohibition against assistance in nuclear weapons production was
against non-nuclear-weapons states only; that is, assistance by one
nuclear weapons state to another in the matter of production of
nuclear weapons was not prohibited. 18 The second loophole concerned
the use of the terms "transfer" and "control" in Article I. India has
noted that these terms have specific legal connotations not encompassing the prospect of establishing nuclear weapon bases in the
non-nuclear-weapon countries, control being retained by the concerned nuclear-weapon state. 19 India has criticized this "indirect
proliferation" and the deficiency in the Treaty of its treatment of the
personal character of proliferation, but not its territorial character.
India's broad view of proliferation includes all its forms: vertical,
horizontal, direct, indirect; the distinctions made in the Treaty are
indistinguishable in India's view. This is evident in India's third
objection to Article I: the lack of prohibition against the stockpiling of
nuclear arsenals by the nuclear-weapon states. India finds it counterproductive to differentiate between vertical proliferation, the increase
in nuclear arms stockpiles by weapons states which the Treaty
ignores, and horizontal proliferation, the increase in states developing
nuclear weaponry which the Treaty expressly forbids. India has also
asserted that vertical proliferation is in contravention to principles
enunciated by the General Assembly, particularly in its Resolution
2153A (XXI), which begins:
Noting that i.t has not yet been possible to reach an
agreement on an international treaty to prevent the proliferation
of nuclear weapons,
Viewing with apprehension the possibility that such a
situation may lead not only to an increase of nuclear arsenals
18. The draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: a critical appraisal. 8
Indian Journal of International Law 223, 225 (1968).
19. The draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: a critical appraisal. 8
Indian Journal of International Law 223, 285 (1968).
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and to a spread of nuclear weapons over the world but also to an
increase in the number of nuclear-weapon Powers, . . . 20
In India's eyes, this resolution contemplated a prohibition of further
production of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon states. The construction of the resolution does indicate that to the General Assembly, vertical proliferation is the foremost component in the conception
of proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Indian position on proliferation by the nuclear weapons states is that the loopholes provided in
Article I create an illusory obligation, unlike the exacting and
comprehensive restrictions placed on the non-nuclear weapon states
elsewhere in the Treaty.
The imbalance of obligations is reflected in other aspects of the
Treaty. For instance, India objected to the imposition of IAEA
safeguards over the peaceful nuclear industry of non-nuclear-weapon
states, considering it an infringement of national sovereignty. The
safeguards were made mandatory for non-nuclear-weapon states to
detect and prevent diversion of peaceful nuclear plants and materials
to clandestine military use. These safeguards were considered
somewhat extraneous for nuclear weapon states on the assumption
that states already possessing nuclear weapons would have no reason
to develop a secret arsenal. In addition, the Soviets have so far
refused to allow international inspection on their own territory, and
the U.S., although advocating inspection safeguards, was willing to
concede its application to the nuclear-weapons states. This was seen,
in India, as "an invidious discrimination of a humiliating character
based on an unfounded distrust of non-nuclear weapon states and the
desire to safeguard the national interests of the nuclear weapon
states. . . . This is yet another manifestation of inequality in the
draft Treaty." 21 India's objections to this inequality have acquired
more validity in recent years due to the increasing awareness of
possible acquisition of nuclear explosives by individuals through
theft. 22
The security assurances, or lack of them, were also a subject of
India's concern. As a non-aligned state, India noted that non-nuclearweapon states, who are asked to deprive themselves of the right to
produce and acquire nuclear weapons, should acquire adequate
20. A!Res12153A (XXI) Jan. 4, 1966; Documents on Disarmament, 1966, at 721.
21. The draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: a critical appraisal. 8
Indian Journal of International Law 223, 229 (1968).
22. Dunn, L.A. Nuclear proliferation and world politics. 430 Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 96, 103-105 (March 1977).
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collective security measures against nuclear attacks. Since the Treaty
is silent on this issue, any collective measures must be in accord with
the U.N. Charter. There is nothing in the Charter which assures
immediate help against aggression as a matter of course. The
. Security Council, of which each of the states with veto power is a
nuclear-~~pon state, would most likely be paralyzed in the event of
a nuclear attack. This leaves non-nuclear-weapon states little choice
but to align themselves with one or another military pact, such as
NATO or the Warsaw Pact. India, unwilling to do this, preferred
security guarantees to come from powers "in different camps," 23 but
such a joint U.S.-Soviet guarantee has not been feasible. Even if it
were, such an arrangement would have to be reciprocal, in that one
party would be obliged to aid India in a nuclear attack only if the
other party averred in the situation. India has been justifiably
unwilling to depend for its security on the continuation of U.S.-Soviet
detente. And, as far as U.S. support goes, India has been wary of
alignment with the U.S. since the 1971 India-Pakistan War, when the
U.S. aided Pakistan.
The dichotomy between the nuclear-weapon states and the nonnuclear-weapons states created by the Treaty in terms of obligations,
responsibilities, and benefits, institutionalized an inferior status for
India which it was not willing to maintain. Their representative to
the ENDC stated before that body that:
By all means let us talk of regulation of armaments universally; by all means let us talk of non-armament universally; by all means let us talk of arms restraint and arms
control- universally. But any attempt to impose non-armament
particularly on unarmed countries, and any tendency to talk only
in terms of imposing nonarmament on some countries - weak
countries, countries which have faced, are facing and will face
threats to their security and loss or occupation of their territory,
countries which face threats to their independence and territorial
integrity, countries whose security is in danger - is, to use an
American phrase, "counter-productive."24
India was not a nuclear weapon state when these objections were
voiced, although it subsequently became one. The reservations
23. Dougherty, J.E. The treaty and the non-nuclear states. 11 Orbis 360, 365
(1967), quoting from a statement by the Prime Minister in the Lok Sabha on July 17,
1967, quoted in Weekly India News, July 28, 1967, at 6.
24. Statement by Ambassador Trivedi, ENDC/PV, 314, July 18, 1967, at 5.
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expressed by that country take on increasing relevance when
examining current non-nuclear-weapon states for their motivations
and capabilities to "go nuclear." Understanding the present situation
among the non-nuclear-weapon states is the next step in developing a
sense of perspective on the process of proliferation.

C. Non-nuclear-weapon states and the NPT
Of the 109 parties to the NPT, only three have nuclear weapons
capability. The remaining 106 signatories include 35 states with
peaceful domestic nuclear power programs. In addition 9 states have
peaceful power programs but are not parties to the Treaty. 25
Horizontal proliferation within the near future will come from those
countries with some form of peaceful nuclear program now in effect,
because it is only in those countries that a nuclear weapons program
can conceivably be developed within a short period of time. The
Treaty obligations of non-nuclear-weapon states will first be discussed, and the spectrum of states in the non-nuclear category will be
analyzed as to their propensity toward proliferation.
Treaty obligations. The obligation imposed on the non-nuclear
weapon states in Article II parallel those for the weapons states in
Article I. Non-weapon states pledge not to receive the transfer of
nuclear weapons, or control over them from any transfer whatever.
More importantly, they cannot manufacture or otherwise acquire
nuclear weapons, or seek or receive assistance in such manufacture.
This prohibition applies not only to nuclear weapons, but also to
"other nuclear explosive devices." The prohibition against receiving
encompasses the receiving of nuclear weapons from nuclear-weapon
states not party to the Treaty. Like Article I, however, there is a
loophole as to the territorial character of proliferation: a non-nuclearweapon state can permit a base even for a nuclear-weapon state not
party to the Treaty, allowing that state to harbor and operate nuclear
weapons. This is of grave consequence to countries like India, which
are not committed to any power bloc.
The other salient feature of the Treaty with regard to nonnuclear-weapon states is contained in Article III, in which these
states undertake to accept IAEA safeguards for their peaceful nuclear
power programs. As previously stated, these safeguards are not
25. Congressional Research Service,. Library of Congress. Facts on Nuclear
Proliferation, for the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, 94th
Congress, 1st Sess. 54-66 (1975). These figures include states which will have
operational power plants by 1980.
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imposed on the nuclear-weapon states. The 1975 NPT Review
Conference has suggested that these safeguards be extended to all
countries with peaceful programs, no matter what their status. In the
final declaration of the review conference, it was declared that:
The conference attaches considerable importance to the continued
application of safeguards under Article III, on a nondiscriminatory basis, for the equal benefit of all states party to
the Treaty . . . . The Conference expresses the hope that all
states having peaceful nuclear activities will establish and
maintain effective accounting and control systems and welcomes
the readiness of the IAEA to assist states in so doing. 26
The reservations expressed by some of the non-nuclear-weapon
states in regard to their treaty obligations parallel those that played
a part in India's rejection of the Treaty. More relevant to this
discussion is a delineation from among those non-nuclear-weapon
states as to which are more likely to go nuclear in the future. The
next additions to the group of powers possessing nuclear weapons
have been called the "Nth powers" by some; 27 but because that term
indirectly assumes that there will be an addition to this group, here
the group of possible proliferators will be referred to as threshold
countries.
Analysis of non-nuclear countries. Among the present nonnuclear states, the majority does not have domestic peaceful nuclear
programs. The likelihood of proliferation among these countries in
the near future is virtually nonexistent, as their indigenous technologies do not encompass nuclear power or a nuclear fuel cycle. There
are a few countries in this group that do have uranium reserves
within their territory 28 , thus these countries do have a future fuel
source. But without accompanying technology, these uranium reserves should not be a source of concern over those states' future in
the sphere of weapons proliferation.
Of greater concern to this analysis are those countries with
domestic nuclear power programs and whether or not such countries

26. Review conference of the parties to the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons: final declaration. 14 International Legal Materials 1061, 1062-1063 (1975).
27. See, e.g., Kapur, A. Nth powers of the future. 430 Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 84, 84-95 (March 1977).
28. Central African Empire, Bagon, Niger.
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are parties to the NPT. !insert Figure ll"" For some of these countries,
the military incentives to proliferate are slight because they are
adequately covered by the nuclear umbrellas established through
NATO and the Warsaw Pact, or other security guarantees. The
Non-Proliferation Treaty does not interfere with existing arrangements within NATO for defense of United States allies during
nuclear attack. Initial Soviet drafts of the Treaty appeared to prohibit
existing arrangements for the deployment in allied territory by the
U.S. of nuclear weapons under its custody and control, for the
training of allied troops for defense against nuclear attack, and for
allied consultations and planning for such defense. But the compromise worked out in this area contained no such prohibitions.
To further clarify the matter, an interpretation of the Treaty,
worked out within the NATO states and given to the Soviets, stated
unequivocably that:
Articles I and II do not deal with arrangements for deployment of
nuclear weapons within allied territory as these do not involve
any transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them unless and
until a decision were made to go to war, at which time the Treaty
would no longer be controlling . . . . [Articles I and II] do not
deal with allied consultations and planning on nuclear defense so
long as no transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them
results. 30
This interpretation does not preclude substitution of new nuclear
weapons for those the United States now has deployed on allied
territory, nor does it preclude the consultations and planning
undertaken by the seven-nation NATO Nuclear Planning Group in
developing political guidelines for the possible use of tactical nuclear
weapons in Europe. 31 It is the security afforded by the NATO nuclear
umbrella that is the major disincentive for these countries to
proliferate.
29. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The Nuclear Age.
Stockholm, Almquist and Wiksell International, 1974. Published in collaboration with
the MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
30. Hearings on Executive H (The Non-Proliferation Treaty) before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th Congress, 1st and 2nd Sess. 5-6 (Part 1, 1968);
Hearings on the Military Implications of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 91st Congress, 1st Sess.
11-12 (1969).
31. Wohlstetter, A. Spreading the bomb without quite breaking the rules. 25
Foreign Policy 88, 92 (1977).
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FIGURE 129
Non-nuclear-weapons states
with domestic power programs
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Brazil
Bulgaria
Canada
Chile
Columbia
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Egypt
Finland
Fed. Rep. Germany
German Dem. Rep.
Greece
Hungary
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Italy
Japan
Korea, South
Mexico
Netherlands
Norway
Pakistan
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan [Republic of China]
Thailand
Turkey
Uruguay
Venezuela
Vietnam, South
Yugoslavia
Zaire

NPT

Number of
reactors"'

Indigenous uranium
resources

party

7

yes
yes
no
no
yes
no
yes
no
no
yes
yes
no
yes
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
yes
yes
yes
no
yes
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
yes
yes
yes
no
no
no
yes
no
no
no
yes
yes

no
yes
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
yes
no
no
yes
yes
yes
no
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes

2
4
8
4
5
20
1
1
8
3
1
4
61
4
1
3
1
1
1
2
23
50
3
4
8
2
2
1
4
1
1
2
16
14
14
6
2
1
1
1
1
5
1

"'Includes research reactors and operational power reactors through 1980.
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Since August, 1969, any NATO party has the right to end its own
obligations upon one year's notice. Major non-nuclear European allies
of.the United States, particularly West Germany, rely upon NATO for
their nuclear deterrent against possible Soviet attack by conventional
or nuclear weapons. But should enough countries withdraw from
NATO to bring it to an end as an effective alliance, or should the
United States alone withdraw, West Germany, Italy, and some of the
smaller countries might well look to their own nuclear defenses. West
Germany's apprehension on this score was such that the United
States felt compelled to reassure that country that should NATO
dissolve, the national interests of non-nuclear NATO members might
be affected to such an extent as to justify their withdrawal from the
Non-Proliferation Treaty. 32
For the time being, however, the NATO alliance is secure, and
the United States has taken steps to indicate that there has been no
weakening of commitment to the alliance. If the status quo is
maintained, the next proliferator will not come from the ranks of the
NATO allies. But there is another group of states which do not have
the firm commitment of a nuclear power, and where proliferation may
be more of a problem. From the point of view of a non-nuclear state,
the ideal security guarantee would probably be a promise by one or
more nuclear powers to come to its assistance should it be attacked, or
threatened, by still another nuclear power. To the extent that such a
guarantee extended the "nuclear umbrella" over the non-nuclear
state, it could both deter a nuclear strike and provide reassurance
against nuclear blackmail, that is using the threat of nuclear force to
create unequal bargaining positions. To the extent that the promised
assistance included support against conventional attacks, it could
ease fears of local incursions. And to the extent that the promises
were made more tangible to the non-nuclear country in the form of
military aid and troop deployments in strategic areas, they could
become even more meaningful than more formal commitments. 33 But,
for many reasons, adequate security guarantees are lacking, and
proliferation may occur as the countries in question hunt for
alternatives to the nuclear umbrella. One reason for this is that the
nuclear-weapon states themselves have been reluctant to assert
wholesale nuclear assurances, or to treat neutrals with more
32. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Exec. Rep. No. 9, Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations 12, (1968).
33. Boskey, B. & Willrich, M., eds. Nuclear Proliferation: Prospects for Control The
Dunellen Company, Inc., New York, 1970, at 122.
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deference than allies. The United States, for one, has been unwilling
to be drawn into stronger guarantees against a nuclear strike, or to
furnish troops to repel a conventional attack, lest such measures
automatically involve it in a conflict between a nuclear power and a
non-nuclear one. Such risk can be reduced by a joint U.S.-Soviet
nuclear guarantee, but so far the only joint guarantee is that
expressed by the U.N. Security Council in conjunction with the NPT.'14
This resolution does not adequately insure security for several
reasons. The first is that if offers guarantees only against nuclear
aggression or the threat of such aggression, leaving open the
possibility of a conventional attack. For some states, a conventional
attack is what they fear most, and against which they look to tactical
nuclear weapons for their deterrent capability. Another inadequacy is
that the resolution covers only parties to the treaty, leaving exposed
countries that are the most likely to proliferate, as was India when
the resolution was adopted. Also, the resolution implies collective
assistance by the three nuclear-weapon states that are parties to the
Treaty, and provides that such assistance will be given through the
Security Council, where each of the guarantors, as well as France and
China, has a veto. The constructionists of the resolution must well
have been aware that the resolution, intended to assure security for
non-nuclear-weapon states and secure their adherence to the Treaty,
added nothing to existing rights and obligations accorded by the U.N.
Charter. And besides the collective self-defense envisioned by the
resolution, the inherent right of individual self-defense is reaffirmed,
though, ironically, the resolution applies in the event of a nuclear
attack, when non-nuclear states will have already contracted away
the right to defend themselves on the same military level as their
nuclear attackers, through adherence to the Treaty. The prospect that
this resolution would effectively reduce the fears and concerns of
non-nuclear states and so win their accession to the Treaty would
seem to be small, and indeed this resolution did not induce countries
with severe security problems to adhere to the Treaty.
For these countries the incentives to proliferate are strong.
Several of these are considered "outlaw states," in bad graces with the
rest of world opinion as expressed by the U.N. General Assembly.
The list here includes Israel, South Africa, and Taiwan, states which
may tend to see an indigenous nuclear weapons option as the
ultimate method of self-defense against hostile states that would like
34. United Natwns Security Council Resolutwn on Security Assurances. SIRES!
255, (XXll), June 19, 1968. The resolution appears at Appendix B.
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to see an end to the threatened regime or state. This second category
of non-nuclear states, as opposed to those for whom the nuclear
umbrella alliances are operative, had a military incentive for a move
toward nuclear weapons, but this is not necessarily the only
inducement toward proliferation. For some, the incentives to proliferate closely follow India's reservations about the NPT, and the
political, military, and economic problems for which it turned to
nuclear technology as a solution.
II.

The Threshold States

There are two very different kinds of incentives for nuclear
proliferation. The more traditional view considers nuclear weapons in
their political-military strategem of potential, another step on the
continuum of tactical military equipment that probably began with
the spear or sharpened stone. The other kind of incentive is economic,
and less discernible at first glance. Peaceful nuclear programs have
deVf'!loped rapidly in certain areas of the world because they have
been proven cost-effective, or have been perceived as such. Yet the
cost-effectiveness of nuclear energy is enhanced by completing the
fuel cycle with indigenous chemical separation plants, breeder
reactors, and the like, all of which will pull countries closer to actual
weapons production. There is also the problem of peaceful nuclear
explosions (PNE) and the ways they are perceived in different states.
A. Political and military motivation
It has already been noted that several states view the military
incentives for acquiring nuclear weapons strong enough to override
the various disincentives."But it has also been noted that the United
States, at least, perceives nuclear weapons effectiveness in terms of
conventional strike force, dismissing a small nuclear capability as of
little consequence. Why, then, is there a persistent logic in perceiving
nuclear weapons, in even a small capability, as a military tool? This
can be demonstrated best in relation to a specific state, such as
Pakistan, with due regard to its specific problems and solutions.
Pakistan is a small country with a centralized population and a
history of animosity towards India, but with amicable relations
toward its other neighbor, Iran. Pakistan has closely followed India's
example in the nuclear realm. For example, Pakistan purchased a
nuclear reactor from Canada shortly after India did; Pakistan's power
plant became operational just two years after India's. India's example
in refusing to become a party to the NPT has been followed by
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Pakistan. As of now India has developed nuclear explosives and
Pakistan has not. Although the balance of power in South Asia
favored India even before its 1974 nuclear explosion, the nuclear
capability has sharply increased India's advantage. At least for the
forseeable future, India's nuclear option has made it unlikely that
Pakistan would attack India in order to liberate Kashmir, one of
three regions claimed by Pakistan. 35 It has also added another
element to the conventional war scenario. The acquisition of nuclear
weapons by Pakistan at this point would accomplish little in
equalizing their military strengths. But without at least a viable
nuclear option, the military gap between the two countries will
widen, weakening the Pakistani position.
Pakistan began its nuclear program in 1965 with a research
reactor, 36 and that same year concluded an agreement with Canada
for the purchase of a heavy water reactor 7 which became operational
in 1971. Since that time, Pakistan has announced its intention to
install one reactor every two years, beginning in 1980 until the end of
the century; they have also negotiated with France for the purchase
of a chemical separation plant, a plan which has since fallen through.
Pakistan's nuclear expansion plans exceed even the IAEA estimates
for optimum energy production. And the IAEA estimates have been
criticized as being too excessive, at least in Pakistan's case, where the
rural economy is stable, and where per capita consumption of energy
actually decreased at the same time that country's GNP rose. 38 It is
even questionable whether nuclear energy is at all cost-efficient in
Pakistan's case, where domestic production of its oil needs is already
at 40% and still increasing and where dam-created hydroelectric
power efficiently provides both power and irrigation capability for
less than half the cost of a nuclear reactor with the same power
output. 39
The Pakistan government, while asserting that its nuclear
expansion program is intended for the production of energy, may well
be moving toward its own detonation of nuclear explosives. And
35. The others are Janahadh and Hyderabad.
36. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Facts on Nuclear
Proliferation, for the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, 94th
Congress, 1st Sess. 61-62 (1975).
37. Khalilzad, Z. Pakistan: the making of a nuclear power. 16 Asian Survey 580,
580 (1976).
38. Ibid, p. 582.
39. Pakistan Yearbook 1973. Karachi National Publication House Ltd., 1974, at
300-313.
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while its current policy, when measured ::tgainst IAEA standards,
seems merely a case of too much too fast, the main reason for
interpreting Pakistan's move in the nuclear field as pointing toward a
weapons capacity is its relations with India. The Indian explosion
affects many countries, but none more so than Pakistan. India's
expanding nuclear program even prior to the 1974 explosion had been
a source of concern to Pakistan. In 1966 Foreign Minister Bhutto said
that if India produced a nuclear bomb Pakistan would follow suit
even if it had to "eat grass" to do so ...' Bhutto was the chief engineer of
Pakistan's nuclear program, first urging President Ayub Khan to
develop a nuclear device, then, upon his own assumption of power,
working to expand the program through the stepped-up reactor
program and the reprocessing plant purchase from France. Bhutto
also rejected the notion of a no-war pact with India because of the
latter's nuclear explosion, asserting that under the circumstances
such a pact would mean capitulation for Pakistan.
The Pakistani government rejected Indian assurances that the
explosion was for peaceful purposes. Pakistan not only feels
threatened by Indian capabilities, but also does not trust Indian
intentions, claiming that in the past many assurances by India have
remained unhonored. India's assertion that the explosion was only a
"peaceful test" has not assuaged Pakistani fears at all, for Pakistan,
unlike India, does not distinguish between PNEs and weapons
detonation. Pakistan is also concerned about India's medium range
missiles, with a nuclear delivery system capability twice that of
Pakistan's. 41
Proliferation in Pakistan will validate the chain-reaction theory
in nuclear proliferation. Already, Pakistan's atomic energy talent is
first rate, and with fuel-cycle capability provided by the French
reprocessing plant, it may have by 1980-1981 a capacity to explode a
nuclear device.'i To meet the Indian challenge, Pakistan has adopted
a three-pronged policy. First, Pakistan developed and expanded its
own nuclear option with a reactor purchase in 1975 and announced
its plans to build a reactor every two years. In the same year,
negotiations with France for more sophisticated fuel-cycle technology
40. Kapur, A. Nth powers of the future. 430 Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 84, 89 (March, 1977).
41. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Facts on Nuclear
Proliferation, for the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, 94th
Congress, 1st Sess. 59-62 (1975).
42. Kapur, A. Nth powers of the future. 430 Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 84, 89-90 (March, 1977).
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began. Next, Pakistan began to publicly demand, in reaction to the
Indian explosion, that India open its nuclear installations to international inspection and renounce any intention to produce nuclear
weapons. It also suggested that South Asia be made a nuclear-weapon
free zone, in the process gaining international support for its
anti-proliferation position while simultaneously generating justification for going nuclear itself should India reject the demands. External
guarantees were also sought against nuclear threat or aggression,
minimizing the effect of Indian nuclear blackmail which Pakistan
perceived as imminent. Pakistan joined with the Persian Gulf states
in a mutual defense treaty which provides for Pakistan's use of
Mirage Jet fighters with nuclear delivery capability in an emergency
situation. Finally, Pakistan also began seeking conventional arms as
a trade-off to threats to go nuclear. It persuaded the U.S. to lift its
arms embargo, stating that the embargo had not contributed to
regional stability, and that the disparity in military capability
between India and Pakistan was forcing that country into a
military-nuclear program. Pakistan also contracted with France,
China, Iran and Saudi Arabia for aircraft, air-to-surface missiles and
fighter-bombers to modernize its armed forces.
Even with all this activity, Pakistan will not be India's military
equal for some time to come, if at all. If the Indian superiority in
conventional weapons continues even after Pakistan acquires a
nuclear option, in case of a war between the two countries, Pakistan
may choose to detonate nuclear weapons rather than accept conventional defeat. But Pakistan's first-strike capability will doubtless be
unable to eliminate India's entire nuclear response capability. In that
event, India's response would be devastating to Pakistan. Nevertheless, a first-strike capability for Pakistan would signal to India, as
India's explosion did to the rest of the world, that Pakistan is a force
to be reckoned with and that it will not allow technological advances
by India to intimidate it. And for the near future, it is unlikely that
India will flaunt its nuclear capability to disrupt the balance of power
in that region. It is in India's self interest to protect Pakistan as a
strategic buffer, as India has no desire to share common borders with
Iran and the Soviet Union. So, even a small nuclear force in
Pakistan's case may achieve an effective deterrent against a hostile
nuclear power, should India proceed toward operational nuclear
bombs.
The political incentives to proliferate also play a part in
Pakistan's case. Acquisition of atomic weapons would make Pakistan
the first Muslim state with such a capability. This would increase
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Pakistan's prestige and influence in the Muslim world while undermining Iran's conventional military superiority. And as long as
nuclear weapons are perceived in the world as conveying special
status or prestige to the developer, countries like Pakistan will seek
justification for their entry into the club.

B. Economic motivation
Motivation inducing proliferation may also be manifested
through economic justifications. The major economic incentive to
proliferate is found in the overlap between peaceful programs and
military programs utilizing nuclear energy. As nuclear technology
develops, the pursuit of economic advantages brings countries closer
to completing the fuel cycle technology that also enables weapons
production. An understanding of the processes that link peaceful uses
with weapons potential is necessary to an analysis of the economic
forces at work.
Any state with a nuclear power reactor has within its territory
both the basic fissile material for weapons production, and the
capacity to produce fissile materials. Two sorts of fissile materials are
used in atomic weapons: plutonium (Pu-239) and uranium (U-235).
Fission is caused in uranium when a neutron collides with U-235, one
of three kinds of atoms in ordinary uranium, creating an isotope,
U-236, that splits into two fragments, called fission products. The
mass of the fission products is less than the mass of the U-236
nucleus; it is this excess mass that becomes released energy.
Another kind of atom in uranium, U-238, begins the chain
reaction that results in plutonium. The U-238 nuclear is bombarded
with slow neutrons, creating U-239, but fission is not caused in U-238
by slow neutrons. Instead, the U-239 nucleus begins decaying by
emitting electrons which change the chemical balance of the isotope.
This decayed product, neptunium, also undergoes decay, producing
the plutonium isotope Pu-239. In a nuclear reactor, plutonium is
produced in steadily increasing quantities as the uranium fuel is
consumed by fission; nuclear reactors are, therefore, of fundamental
importance to proliferation.
A reactor is essentially a furnace housing a self-sustaining chain
reaction whose heat products are used to generate electricity. The
fission process, through the emission of neutrons, initiates further
fission in neighboring nuclei, sustaining the process continuously. To
this process are added moderators, which slow the velocity of fast
neutrons so that they can be captured by U-235, producing fission.
Commercial power reactors are characterized by the type of modera-
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tor used: graphite, light water (ordinary water), and heavy water (in
which the hydrogen is replaced by deuterium). They are also
characterized by the material used as the coolant, which acts as a
heat conductor: gas, light water, or heavy water. (insert figure 2). 43
Figure 2 43

Fission of U-235 and U-238 Leading to Plutonium Production
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43. Barnaby, F.C.' How states can "go nuclear." 430 Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 29, 31 <March 1977).
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Light water reactors, which were developed mainly by the United
States, contain ordinary water which is used as both moderator and
coolant. These are the most common. Graphite-moderated, gas-cooled
reactors have developed mainly in France and Great Britain, and
were specifically developed to produce plutonium for these countries'
nuclear-weapons programs. Heavy water reactors, developed mainly
by Canada, are less common due to the scarcity and relatively high
cost of heavy water. The plutonium produced by these reactors is not
very efficient for atomic weapons because the fissile isotope of
plutonium, Pu-239, is contaminated by other isotopes of the element,
especially Pu-240. Weapons-grade plutonium should contain 10
percent or less of these isotopes. But fuel rods left in the reactor for
three or more years do produce suitable plutonium for bombs,
although large amounts of plutonium would be needed, and overheating due to spontaneous fission could result. Currently, the amount of
plutonium produced by non-nuclear-weapon states in peaceful nuclear
reactors could theoretically produce 50 atomic bombs per week. 44
Plutonium may also be produced in research reactors, which are
designed primarily to supply neutrons for experimental purposes or
for the production of radioactive isotopes for medical or industrial use.
Israel and South Africa are two countries that have managed to
produce significant quantities of plutonium without commercial
nuclear power plants. 45
Unless extracted from the fuel elements, plutonium remains in
the reactor. Chemical reprocessing plants are the medium through
which plutonium is removed from the fuel rods. Worldwide capacity
for reprocessing is small but growing as countries with significant
nuclear power programs increase reprocessing demand to fuel future
breeder reactors. There are currently eight countries with reprocessing capability, four of which are non-nuclear-weapon states. Five
oth£:r nations, including Brazil and Pakistan, have facilities planned
or under construction. 46
Use of the breeder reactor is one of the most highly controversial
technological innovations on the nuclear front. The fast-breeder
reactor is different from other types in that it produces more fuel than

44. Barnaby, F.C. How states can "go nuclear." 430 Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 29, 33 (March 1977).
45. Guhin, M.A. Nuclear Paradox: Security Risks of the Peaceful Atom. American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research Foreign Affairs Study, 23 (1976).
46. World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1976. Almquist and
wiksell, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm, 1976, at 46-47.
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it consumes. In a breeder reactor the isotope U-238 converts to
plutonium with a greater neutron surplus than is possible in an
ordinary reactor by utilizing a "blanket" of U-238 around the core of
the reactor. This neutron surplus accumulates a stockpile of fissile
material which doubles in amount every ten years. The elements
from the breeder blanket usually contain 95 to 98 percent Pu-239,
considered to be weapons-grade plutonium, and original breeding
may yield future breeder reactors that are actually fueled by
weapon-grade plutonium. Widespread use of the breeder reactor will
place significant amounts of this weapons-grade plutonium within the
territories of dozens of states. Moreover, weapons-grade plutonium
used as the core element of a later-generation breeder reactor does
not need reprocessing to remove plutonium from the fuel elements
because .th-ese elements are virtually pure plutonium. So a country
does not need access to a reprocessing plant to obtain plutonium
suitable for atomic weapons if plutonium has been stockpiled through
a breeder program.
Proponents of breeder reactors argue that breeders represent a
renewable energy source that may eventually release a state from
dependence on both oil-exporting nations and uranium-exporting
nations. Opponents fear the same independence arguing that widespread and indiscriminate use of the breeder will induce countries to
obtain one and duplicate the technology clandestinely, beyond IAEA
safeguards, leaving the option of weapon development open for
speculation. If breeders were proven to be cost efficient, it would be
much harder to question the motives behind a country's development
or acquisition of breeder reactors. Even before the breeder reactor
development, duplication of technology was a problem manifested by
India's bomb, which was developed in an unsafeguarded plant using
capability built up through safeguarded material from Canada and
subsequently duplicated. 47 (insert figure 3)
There is yet another economic barrier to non-proliferation, but
this barrier has less to do with the nuclear non-nuclear weapon state
dichotomy than the growing ideological rift between some of the
major nuclear technology exporters. These supplier states determine
nuclear export policy on both the international and domestic levels,
according to factors that are either predominantly economic, or
polito-military in character. West Germany, for example, has given a

47. Gleissner, J.D. Recent U.S. efforts to control nuclear proliferation. 10
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 271, 281 (1977).
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Figure 3' 8
Heavy Water Reactor:
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primarily economic interpretation to the nuclear issue in its foreign
policy, emphasizing domestic and international determinants primarily concerned with worldwide nuclear markets, technological
48. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Facts on Nuclear
Proliferation: A Handbook for the Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate,
94th Congress, 1st Sess. 216 (1975).
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advancements, and trade or investment interests. Convinced
that proliferation is inevitable, official interpretation of nonproliferation responsibility is minimal. The emphasis placed on
market dimensions has substantial policy implications in the growing
competitiveness and level of nuclear trade, as current action in
nuclear commerce involves the diffusion of weapons-sensitive technologies. Intense competition for react.or export orders creates incentives to achieve the competitive advantage by offering package deals
of reactor and fuel technology. Though the reactor sale is today a
commonplace event, the spread of enrichment and reprocessing
technologies used to obtain fissile materials poses a serious problem.
French and German policies to transfer these technologies to such
places as Pakistan and Brazil create a competitive situation where
proliferation concerns run a poor second to market concerns. The U.S.
·has responded to these policies by proposing alternatives to bilateral
agreements, such as a multinational fuel cycle center, and by calling
meetings of nuclear suppliers to consider self-imposed restraints on
imports. But because these European countries are economically,
rather than politically or security oriented, they are suspicious of U.S.
attempts at export controls, believing that the United States is
advocating restraint by other countries so that it can regain the
virtual monopoly it once held on world nuclear technology. These
countries assert that the U.S. is attempting to penalize European
companies, and also point to the NPT and its loopholes as justification
for breeder reactor and reprocessing plant sales. 49 The failure of
supplier states to reach ideological accord has been exploited both by
the suppliers themselves and the countries whose rapid leap into the
more advanced areas of nuclear technological development indicates
potential weapons development. This challenges the premise that
nuclear sales to countries possibly concealing their desire for nuclear
weapons should be undertaken with special care. In the cur:rent
status of nuclear export marketing, there is virtually no incentive to
apply extra precautions or attach restrictions to nuclear sales, and
even current IAEA safeguards and the NPT allow for considerable
leeway.
It can be surmised that technological restrictions will not
effectively retard proliferation, not only because restraints on sales
are ineffective in the competitive nuclear marketplace, but because
with the state of knowledge worldwide, time alone could close the
49. Wonder, E. Nuclear commerce and proliferation: Gennany and Brazil, 1975. 21
Orbis 277, 277-278 (1977).
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technological gap. As a political objective, nuclear proliferation is
most effectively controlled in a political context, through development
of a multilayered policy capable of producing an effect on the broad
spectrum of non-nuclear states with their various motivations.
III.

U.S. policy and Pakistan prospects

It is clear from the preceding that the NPT alone is inadequate as
the sole non-proliferation deterrent. Economic, political, military, and
technological considerations are not addressed by the treaty, which
attempts to reduce non-I?roliferation to a purely legal issue. The
principle motivations to retain or pursue a nuclear option are not
countered or neutralized by the NPT. The objections to the treaty,
raised primarily by non-signatories but also by signatories participating in the ~975 NPT Review Conference, have not resulted in any
attempt to reduce the inequities of the treatment of non-nuclearweapons states under the treaty. And the policies of those nuclear
weapons states who are signatories to the NPT have helped to foster
rather than inhibit the development of nuclear weapons capabilities
by threshold states. The United States in particular must accept
responsibility for the current situation which its ambivalent responses to the spectre of proliferation have helped create.

A. U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy
The United States has not had a static non-proliferation strategy.
Initially, during World War II and immediately thereafter, the
non-proliferation policy was based on containment and secrecy. Along
with Great Britain and Canada, the U.S. concluded a trilateral
agreement in 1943 designed to restrict third-party access to both
technology and uranium. This policy was also reflected in U.S.
domestic legislation such as the McMahon Act, but lasted only as long
as an effective monopoly of the two essential components of nuclear
industry, uranium and technology, was maintained.
The Lilienthal-Baruch Plan, presented to the United Nations
Atomic Energy Commission in 1946, was also a manifestation of a
containment philosophy. This plan proposed an international authority to regulate and manage on a worldwide basis the field of atomic
energy through "various forms of ownership, dominion, licenses,
operation, inspection, research and management by competent per-
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sonnel."50 The Lilienthal-Baruch proposal was rejected by the Soviet
Union because of the excessive constraints placed on the national
sovereignity of countries wishing to d~velop nuclear technology. 5 1
The containment strategy of non-proliferation lasted only until
1953, when it became apparent that Soviet nuclear technology was
becoming both competitive and diversified. This development meant
that the Soviets, unencumbered by restrictive containment agreements, would be in a position to disseminate the peaceful applications
of its nuclear research. It was this commercially competitive aspect,
combined with a newly emerging attitude which appeared to accept
the inevitability of proliferation, that led to the adoption of a different
non-proliferation stance by the United States.
The new policy was revealed by President Eisenhower in 1953.
Besides calling for an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
the proposal broke new ground from an American philosophical
standpoint by envisioning widespread peaceful application of nuclear
technology:
The more important responsibility of the Atomic Energy Agency
would be to devise methods whereby this fissionable material
would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind.
Experts would be mobilized to apply atomic energy to the needs
of agriculture, medicine, and other peaceful activities. A special
purpose would be to provide abundant electrical energy to the
power-starved areas of the world. Thus the contributing powers
would be dedicating some of their strength to serve the needs
rather than the fears of mandkind.
The United States would be more than willing - it would be
proud to take up with others principally involved in the
development of plans whereby such peaceful use of atomic energy
would be expedited. 52

50. Address by Bernard M. Baruch to the United Nations Atomic Energy
Commission I (June 14, 1946), reprinted in Reader on Nuclear Non-Proliferation,
prepared for the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Federal Services of
the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 95th Congress. 2nd Sess. ( 19781.
51. Guhin, M., Nuclear Paradox: Security Risks of the Peaceful Atom, American
Enterprise Institute for Policy Research (1976), at 7 !1976).
52. Address by Dwight D. Eisenhower to the United Nations General Assembly
!December 8, 1953), reprinted in Reader on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, prepared for the
Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Federal Services of the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs, 95th Congress, 2nd Sess. !1978).
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Thus, the United States prepared not only to accept what was
considered by this time an almost inevitable progression toward
nuclear industry, but to lead the way in advocating peaceful
application of nuclear technology. The U.S. conveniently modified its
non-proliferation strategy at a time when it could still expect to
exploit its lead in nuclear technology in the marketplace. Until this
point, U.S. priorities had placed international control over peaceful
nuclear development. "Thereafter, development came first and international control and inspection second, if at all." 53
The Atoms for Peace address before the United Nations General
Assembly began with a recitation of the fearful potential of atomic
weapons while acknowledging that the United States arsenal of such
weapons "of course" increases daily. It then went on to propose joint
atomic contributions to the IAEA without even indicating the
consequences in terms of weapons proliferation that widespread
dissemination of nuclear technology would have, other than stating
rather euphemistically that such steps would "hasten the day when
fear of the atom will begin to disappear". The Atoms for Peace
proposal also failed to confront the ideological disparity in professing
nuclear disarmament while simultaneously stockpiling those same
arms, a disparity which continues to plague U.S. efforts to halt
horizontal proliferation. Nevertheless, the Atoms for Peace plan was
welcomed by many in the international community, especially by
developing countries intrigued by both the prestige associated with
this new technology and its long-term potential for economic benefit.
India in particular was in a position to benefit from the United States'
newly co-operative stance, having established the necessary domestic
intrastructure in the form of an Atomic Energy Commission as early
as 1948. 54 Over 1100 Indian scientists and engineers were trained in
U.S. facilities during the Atoms for Peace period as India acquired the
technical expertise to assemble the Apsara research reactor in 1956
and complete a small reprocessing plant in 1964. 55
After initially lagging behind Great Britain, Canada, and France
in the nuclear export race of the 1950's, the United States was able to
capitalize on its monopoly of the enriched uranium field. "With the
approval and help of the Government, [the American nuclear
53. Guhin, M., Nuclear Paradox: Security Risks of the Peaceful Atom, American
Enterprise Institute for Policy Research 11976l, at 11.
54. Khan, M.A., Nuclear Energy and International Co-operation: A Third World
Perception of the Erosion of Confidence, The Rockefeller Foundation/The Royal Institute
of International Affairs, London, 1979, at 7.
55. Id.
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industry] was able to export some forty research reactors, less
expensive than natural uranium fueled ones, to countries all over the
world, some of which were not yet really ready to profit from such a
sophisticated facility. American industry was also able to test on
European grounds its not so 'proven' enriched uranium light water
power reactors owing to a well-timed and financially favorable United
States - European agreement." 56 Besides technology and facilities,
the United States alone was able to export enriched uranium, giving
it an immeasurable commercial and political advantage. Essentially,
U.S. policy by this point centered on the containment of "sensitive"
reprocessing and enrichment technology by obviating the need of
other countries to acquire such indigenous capability. Another basic
tenet of U.S. policy was the requirement of safeguards, first through
bilateral agreements and later under IAEA auspices.
By the mid 1960's the United States was the undisputed leader in
nuclear exports. The threat of Soviet competition never really
materialized; the Soviets confined exports to countries in its orbit or
who were politically friendly. The British never exported any power
plants after their initial 1958 sales to Italy and Japan, while France
sold only one natural uranium graphite moderated plant to Spain in
1965.07 Canadian natural uranium fueled reactors did not gain the
widespread acceptance that American enriched uranium reactors
acquired, primarily because of the relative scarcity of the heavy water
used as a coolant in Canadian reactors. Thus by the time negotiations
began on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States
could afford the appearance of magnanimity in nuclear nonproliferation negotiations though only to the extent such posturing
did not disturb the status quo of the marketplace.
The NPT did not receive the widespread acceptance that the
nuclear powers had hoped. The discriminatory regime it promoted
and the lack of security assurances in particular made it unacceptable
to about twenty nations already possessing or planning a nuclear
facility, including two nuclear weapons powers, France and China.
But the United States· continued to rely on the NPT as its primary
non-proliferation effort, at least until the mid 1970's. By that time,
the Indian nuclear test explosion and renewed commercial competition in the export field from France and Germany convinced many

56. Goldschmidt, B. A historical survey of non-proliferation policies. 2< 1) International Security 69, 73 <Summer, 1977).
57. Goldschmidt, supra, at 73-74.
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that the United States was losing its ability to effect its nonproliferation goals.
U.S. response to these developments was to consult with the
other main nuclear suppliers to establish a reinforced export policy
based on the common consent of these suppliers. Representatives of
Great Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union
and the United States met in London in 1975 to create new guidelines
for export restrictions. At this point it became apparent that an
ideological rift was developing among the exporting countries. Some,
like the United States, wanted to erect technological barriers to
proliferation by barring sales of reprocessing and enrichment plants,
and sales of material that could be used for weapons. Other countries
wanted to restrict such sales only to those countries which would not
submit to IAEA inspection and verification. In any case, the overall
effect of the London suppliers' meetings was the creation of a new
discriminatory structure based on a supplier state/receiver state
dichotomy in addition to the we11pon state/non-weapon state division
previously created by the NPT.
Today the United States continues to rely on supplier restraint as
a major factor in curbing the prospect of proliferation. It pressured
France to cancel its agreement with Pakistan to supply a reprocessing
plant (which France did in 1978). South Korea also cancelled its
reprocessing plant which was to be built with French assistance. The
United States also tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade Germany to
modify its long-term agreement with Brazil which includes transfer
to that country of complete fuel-cycle capability. Meanwhile, the
United States proceeded with two major tactics designed to strengthen its non-proliferation efforts. These tactics are the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 and the commissioning of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), completed in February, 1980.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 197858 (hereinafter 1978
Act) was aimed primarily at reducing technological incentives and
capabilities to proliferate through several approaches: (1) by being a
reliable supplier of nuclear fuel to those countries adhering to
non-proliferation policies; (2) by promoting an international organization which would ensure fuel supply and establish repositories for
spent fuel; (3) by extending fuel assurances only to those countries
willing to accept IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear
activities, and requiring such countries to forego establishment of any
58. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, 22 U.S.C.

*3201-!i 3282 Cl978l.
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new enrichment or reprocessing facilities; (4) by promoting economically feasible alternatives to complete fuel cycle capability; (5) by
improving the IAEA safeguards system; (6) by assisting in the
development of non-nuclear energy resources; and (7) by negotiating
with other nations to adopt common international sanctions against
those countries violating the principles of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. Although this list of tactics appears to adequately neutralize
the international tendency toward proliferation, the 1978 Act falls
short of its goals for several reasons.
Supply reliability is an incentive for a country to acquire the
reprocessing or enrichment capability which would give it a selfsustaining fuel cycle. Unfortunately, by the time the 1978 Act was
adopted, the United States was already losing its reputation as a
reliable supplier of nuclear fuel. As early as 1974, the United States
Atomic Energy Commission had suspended the signing of all new
contracts for the supply of enriched uranium. 59 In addition, the
restructuring of U.S. government responsibilities for nuclear activities in 1974 substituted an independent agency (the Nuclear Regulatory Commission) for an executive agency (the AEC). The executive
branch could not guarantee that the policy of absolute supply
reliability would be given priority by the NRC. In addition, because
the United States has not built new uranium enrichment facilities, it
is no longer in a position to monopolize supply of enriched fuels. The
Soviet Union began in 1971 to offer enrichment services to the
Western world. 60 Simultaneously, industrialized European nations
began developing enrichment capability based on non-American
technology, such as centrifuge plants and gaseous diffusion plants
which in the coming decade will further erode U.S. monopolization of
complete fuel cycle technology.
The proposed International Nuclear Fuel Authority will face
opposition of the same type encountered in proposals that the IAEA
play the part of a nuclear materials bank. The major powers want to
reserve for themselves the right to decide the recipients of nuclear
transfers, as well as prescribe the commercial and political conditions
under which such transfers will take place.
The more stringent qualifications on fuel assurances have led
since passage of the 1978 Act to the renegotiation of virtually all U.S.
59. RibicofT, A. A market-sharing approach to the world nuclear sales problem. 54
Foreign Affairs 76, 764 (July 19761.
60. Goldschmidt, B. A historical survey of non-proliferation policies. 211 t International Security 69, 78 !Summer 19771.
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supply contracts to include prohibitions against reprocessing of such
fuel. 6 ' Further requirements of IAEA safeguards on all peaceful
nuclear activities and denial of indigenous reprocessing facilities will
be bitterly contested by importers of U.S. enriched uranium. Such
restrictions may be interpreted as designed to preserve the unequal
status of non-nuclear-weapons states. The effect of this tactic may be
to indirectly encourage proliferation in that some countries may be
motivated to pursue reprocessing capability rather than rely on the
United States assurances that there will be no suppression of
assistance or further restrictive policies.
The promotion of alternatives to complete fuel cy~le technology
was to have been accomplished through the International Nuclear
Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE). This study, commissioned by President Carter in 1977, brought together Western, Soviet bloc, and Third
World scientists and technicians to review alternatives to widespread
use of reprocessing plants and fast breeder reactors. "By organizing
the 60-nation study, the U.S. sought world-wide endorsement of its
decision to delay reprocessing and breeder reactors. . . . U.S.
technicians also hoped the study would come up with engineering
solutions to the plutonium problem, such as more efficient uranium or
thorium nuclear-reactor cycles, which would eliminate the need for
reprocessing and breeders."62
Although initiated as a technical, apolitical exercise, the various
groups of INFCE participants clearly hoped to justify their respective
positions on breeders and reprocessing technology. The United States
and Canada hoped to find support for their anti-plutonium stance.
The West Europeans and Japanese hoped to ratify through consensus
their view that there is no alternative to reprocessing technology, and
that "nuclear consumers are unwilling to have their industrial and
economic interests and security depend on bilateral political relations
for an unspecified period."63 The Third World countries also expected
that breeders and reprocessing would be sanctioned from an economic
standpoint, giving respectability to efforts by those countries to
obtain nuclear self-sufficiency through a complete fuel cycle capability.
61. Franko. L. U.S. regulation of the spread of nuclear technologies through
supplier power: lever or boomerang'? 10 Lau· and Policy in International Business 1181.
1199 119791.
62. International study will rebuff U.S. bid to block ~prPad of nuclear technology.
Wall Street Journal. January 16. 1980. at 5. col. 1.
63. Kapur, A. International Nuclear Proliferation: Multilateral Diplomacy and
Repional A.~pects, Praeger Publishers. New York. 119791 at 104.

36

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STuDIES SERIES

The resulting study, formally adopted in February 1980, dealt a
blow to the anti-plutonium stance of the United States. By remaining
a purely technical undertaking, the study minimized the nontechnological effects of widespread dissemination of reprocessing
technology. In an exercise such as the INFCE, there was no way to
balance economic benefits against proliferation dangers. Already, the
conclusions of the INFCE have taken on broader political implications. For example, the U.S. domestic nuclear industry has used the
INFCE to refute the Carter position that breeder technology contributes to weapons proliferation. 64 And should the United States
continue to oppose breeders and reprocessing despite the INFCE
report, this would provide more substance to the West European
charge that U.S. objections to widespread acquisition of such technology are based more on a desire to protect U.S. nuclear industry, which
lags behind the Europeans in the reprocessing field, than on a
legitimate fear of the military implications of such acquisitions.
Improving the IAEA safeguards system may well aid in preventing proliferation. However, IAEA safeguards currently are respected
and followed, and to date no weapons proliferation has resulted
because of a violation of or inadequacy in the safeguards process.
The development of non-nuclear energy resources is likewise a
commendable gesture, but one which will not noticeably decrease the
prospect of proliferation. If non-nuclear alternatives were vigorously
pursued, this might be of psychological benefit in decreasing the
amount of prestige associated with an extensive domestic nuclear
industry. But even within the Carter administration the view has
been expressed that alternatives will not supplant nuclear power in
the foreseeable future:
It is too early to be categoric about which energy sources will
prove to be dominant by the middle of the next century.
Governments should indeed go ahead with major development of
solar and other renewable energy sources. But at a minimum,
governments would be unwise to deprive themselves of the
nuclear option during the early part of the century when the
transition from oil and gas is likely to occur. A rapid transition to
renewables is likely to be costly and to involve unforseen
problems. A judicious energy policy, like any major social policy,
should have flexibility and redundancy to protect against failures. On this basis, nuclear energy has a major role to play in
64. Wall Street Journal, March 24, 1980, at 23, coL 8.
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relation to the long run problem in the U.S. even if solar
optimism proves to be justified. This is even more true for other
countries with less access to fossil fuel resources to help buffer
the transition to renewable energy technologies. 65
The development of international sanctions is perhaps the
strongest deterrent to proliferation contained in the 1978 Act. The
lack of effective and well-defined sanctions has left a gaping hole in
international nonproliferation strategy. A stumbling block to the
creation of international sanctions may be noted in the language of
the 1978 Act, which refers to sanctions and procedures to be followed
in the event of violations of "material obligations with respect to the
peaceful use of nuclear materials and equipment or nuclear technology, or in the event that any nation violated the provisions of the
[Non-Proliferation] Treaty."66 Questions will undoubtedly be raised
concerning the definition of "material obligations", as well as
concerning the application of sanctions to those countries which have
not accepted any obligations at all in the area of peaceful uses. In
addition, questions will be raised as to the applicability of sanctions
against those countries (the United States and Soviet Union) which
do not appear to be fulfilling their obligations under Article VI of the
NPT, and those countries (particularly the United States) which
appear to be reneging on their obligations under Article IV to
facilitate the fullest possible exchange of peaceful nuclear technology.
Any effort to impose sanctions on non-nuclear-weapon states while
insulating weapons states from them would undoubtedly be roundly
criticized. Besides, is it logical to rely on the prospective development
of international sanctions when the world remained ominously silent
following reports of a South.African nuclear explosion in the fall of
1979? And is it credible to expect the United States to lead the way in
enforcing the provisions of the NPT when it has continuously engaged
in nuclear trade with nations who have refused to ratify the NPT
(and thus are under no obligation not to produce nuclear weapons or
to submit to safeguards of their nuclear activities)? "Of the 29 U.S.
agreements for nuclear co-operations with other countries, no less
than 13 are with non-NPT nations."67
65. Address by JosephS. Nye at the Uranium Institute I July 12, 19781 reprinted in
Reader on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, prepared for the Subcommittee on Energy,
Nuclear Proliferation and Federal Sen•ices of the Senate Committee Governmental
Affairs, 95th Congress, 2nd Sess. I 1978l.
66. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, 22 U.S.C. § 3201-§ 3282 I 1978!.
67. Ribicoff, A. A market-sharing approach to the world nuclear sales problem. 54
Foreign Affairs 764, 766 (July 1976!.
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Thus, both the 1978 Act and the INFCE do not appreciiibly
reduce the technological incentives to proliferate, and do not create
effective barriers to proliferation.
There are philosophical weaknesses in the United States' view of
proliferation and the implementation of its policy that will continue
to inhibit the effectiveness of its initiatives. United States initiatives
have consisted primarily of attempts to maintain technological
barriers to proliferation. The West Europeans in particular do not
share the U.S. view that this is the most effective deterrent to
proliferation. The United States has pursued these technological
restrictions at the expense of a broader view of the incentives and
corresponding disincentives to proliferate. Economic and political
considerations have not been given adequate weight as contributing
factors. Military motivations have been recognized, but the United
States has not implemented security assurances which would greatly
neutralize such motivations. Similarly, not enough credence has been
attached to alternate views of the effectiveness of small nuclear
arsenals, and their political significance. This last view, the "French
view", is closer to the reasoning behind the PRC and Indian nuclear
strategy, but has been minimized by U.S. policymakers.
The United States has shown a willingness to compromise its
non-proliferation goals in the face of commercial competition and
more recently in the face of the perceived Soviet threat. As previously
noted, the United States has not confined its nuclear trade to
countries which have ratified the NPT. The original decision to
promote the peaceful use of nuclear technology worldwide was made
with cognizance of the domestic commercial advantages, and without
an adequate appraisal of the proliferation implications. More recently, the willingness to aid and arm Pakistan in response to the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan demonstrates that pursuit of nonproliferation
is not a priority in the current administration, despite professions to
the contrary. The United States has also indicated that it will not
press India for assurances that it will not detonate another nuclear
device as a precondition to delivery of enriched uranium for the
Tarapur nuclear power plant; rather, it seeks assurances only on -the
use of American fuel and American-built facilties. 68 To avoid a
"political breakdown" with India, the Carter administration recently
asked Congress to approve a 40 ton sale of enriched uranium to that
country despite Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's adamant refusal to

68. New York Times, March 14, 1980. at A7. col. 1.
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accept safeguards."9 Such policies evidence a commitment more to
appearance than to non-proliferation.
The United States no longer holds undisputed leadership in the
peaceful nuclear industry, and must realize that it cannot impose its
will or policies on countries in exchange for supply security. But the
U.S. and other nuclear weapons states have not shown a willingness
to give up anything in exchange for the sacrifices that a non-nuclear
weapons state must make. No effort has been made to reduce the
inequities in the NPT to make it more acceptable to the nonsignatories. On the contrary, the U.S. has supported a discriminatory
supplier's policy following the London suppliers conference in 1975.
The United States failed to persuade participants of the INFCE of
its views regarding the proliferation dangers of complete fuel cycle
capability. In addition, the United States has not taken the lead in
developing ·and introducing alternatives to plutonium technology.
"Although there are about 20 alternatives [to a plutonium nuclear
fuel cycle] that can be discussed, there is little enthusiasm for
re-examing items that have frequently been examined internationally and in national bureaucratic debates."'"
Non-proliferation goals need a long-term strategy to be effective.
This the United States has not had. For example, the Nixon
administration, with Kissinger's encouragement, "had generally
down-played the importance of the proliferation issue in American
foreign relations, compared with the stress on the subject by the
Kennedy and Johnson administrations." 71 The pressure to re-consider
the danger and prospects of nuclear proliferation came from two
directions: public opinion and the May 1974 Indian text. Neither
source was apparently enough to convey the urgency of the situation.
Carter, while appearing steadfast, has actually been equivocal in his
implementation of proliferation strategy.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the United States has not
diligePtly pursued a reversal of vertical proliferation. SALT II has
been shelved in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. But
even SALT II is inadequate as a major step toward disarmament: at
best, it delays serious consideration of vertical de-proliferation; at
worst, it represents an abrogation of the responsibilities of nuclear
weapons states under Article VI of the NPT. As critical as SALT II
69. New realities give India reactor fuel. New York Times, May 11, 1980, at 2E.
70. Kapur, A., Internatconal Nuclear Proliferation: Multilateral Diplomacy and
Regional Aspects, Praeger Publishers, New York 11979J at 104.
71. Kapur, supra, at 183.
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may be toward controlling the nuclear arms race, it does not further
to any extent the cessation of that race, or the prospects for a
non-nuclear world.
B. Prospects for Pakistan
Having established the inadequacy of both the NPT and U.S.
policy in controlling proliferation, what are the prospects for a
threshold country such as Pakistan? Several factors have been
identified as reasons why Pakistan is constrained from currently
developing its nuclear option. 72 For example, Pakistan does not
recognize a distinction between weapons tests and peaceful nuclear
explosions. It has also indicated that it will not conduct any
explosives tests, whether for peaceful or military purposes. Pakistan
has developed a self-image of scrupulousness in its honoring of
international commitments, and is particularly critical of India's
apparent lack of scruples. It has a weak nuclear industrial intrastructure, and also a dependence on intrusive external sources of nuclear
materials.
But such constraints are not absolute. Although it has declared
that it will not test nuclear explosives, Pakistan has not committed
itself to this posture through ratification of the NPT. The declaration
not to test must also be weighed against the determination often
expressed to achieve military equality with India. However honorable
its posture of scrupulousness may be, Pakistan is unlikely to place
scruples above national defense. Its weak nuclear industrial intrastructure is balanced by first rate equipment and technology. Its
dependence on external sources of nuclear materials may be decreasing. The cancellation of the French reprocessing facility may result in
the growth of nuclear nationalism in Pakistan, a growth that would
further remove Pakistani nuclear facilities from IAEA inspection and
safeguards. (insert figure 4 )'3
External threats to Pakistan's security may be increasing rather
than decreasing, particularly in light of the Soviet threat posed by the
invasion of Afghanistan. It would be fallacious to assume that
Pakistan feels protected from India by the weight of world opinion,
especially since India does not feel secure from possible Pakistani
aggression. There is evidence of this in the Indian objections to U.S.
aid to Pakistan. 74 In addition, although Pan-Islamism does not appear
72. See e.g. Kapur, supra, at 209-211.
73. Source: compiled by author.
74. New York Times, March 14, 1980, at A7, col. 1.
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Figure 4' 3
Comparison of Nuclear Status of India and Pakistan';
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to be an immediate possibility, Pak-Islamism may be, with external
strength south to compensate for any internal devisiveness.
Besides these political factors, there are economic indications of
Pakistan's propensity to proliferate. One is that Pakistan's nuclear
plans clearly exceed what is regarded as the optimum level of nuclear
energy for that country, as estimated by the IAEA. A second is that
following the INFCE report, there are documented economic justifica-
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tions for a complete fuel cycle capability. Even if Pakistan were to
continue to renounce its pursuit of nuclear weapons, it is unlikely
that it would forego the chance to legitimately keep the option for
weapons development open through economic justification for a
reprocessing plant.
It is widely accepted, in the United States and elsewhere, that
Pakistan is an imminent proliferator. It is also widely acknowledged
that a country need not detonate a nuclear device to be considered a
threat to non-proliferation. What is not acknowledged is the extent to
which the nuclear powers, and in particular the United States, must
reform their attitudes and policies to deal effectively with the prospect
of proliferation.

C. Some implications for U.S. policy
The first step in a reformed non-proliferation policy is to
neutralize the military incentives to proliferate. Economic and
political control will be most effective in the long run, but those
countries on the threshold of nuclear weapons contemplate current
military and security problems as immediate justification for a move
toward a nuclear option. The United States must strike a delicate
balance with respect to its policy toward imminent proliferators. On
the one hand, the U.S. should avoid extending its nuclear umbrella to
the point of risking involvement in remote conflicts and placing the
U.S. civilian population in the position of nuclear hostages. On the
other hand, non-nuclear states both demand and deserve adequate
security guarantees in exchange for compliance with NPT policy. At
the NPT Review Conference, the participants recognized the security
of non-nuclear weapons states as a priority:
Recognizing that all States have need to ensure their
independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty, the Conference emphasizes the particular importance of assuring and
strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties
which have renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons. It
acknowledges that States Parties find themselves in different
security situations and therefore that various appropriate means
are necessary to meet the security concerns of States Parties. . . .
At the Conference it was also urged that determined efforts
must be made especially by the nuclear weapons States Party to
the Treaty, to ensure the security of all non-nuclear-weapon
States Parties. To this end the Conference urges all States, both
nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States to refrain,
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in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, from the
threat or the use of force in relations between States, involving
either nuclear or non-nuclear-weapons.
Additionally, it stresses the responsibility of all Parties to
the Treaty and especially the nuclear-weapon States, to take
effective steps to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon
States and to promote in all appropriate fora the consideration of
all practical means to this end, taking into account the views
expressed at this Conference. 75
From the point of view of a non-nuclear state, the ideal "security
guarantee" would probably be a promise by one or more nuclear
powers to come to its assistance should it be attacked by, or
threatened by, still another nuclear power. 76 The assurances of
Security Council Resolution 255 (Appendix B) are not very meaningful to non-nuclear states because some states (like West Germany)
felt specifically threatened by one of the guarantors. In addition,
action taken through the Security Council, as is contemplated by the
Resolution, is ineffective by nature because of the veto power held by
every permanent member, each of which possesses nuclear weapons.
And joint action may be stymied as the guaranteeing powers differ on
proposed action, especially if the threat to use nuclear weapons is
directed against one of their allies. U.S. decision-makers need to be
cognizant of all these conflicting pressures before inducing NPT
compliance though security guarantees it may later be unwilling to
uphold.
The second step toward proliferation policy is to downgrade the
political significance of nuclear weapons acquisition. If the U.S.
hesitates in pursuit of an aggressive de-proliferation policy, the world
will not be convinced of the futility of nuclear weapons production.
The U.S. should welcome the inception of nuclear-weapon-free zones
because regional instability is the immediate catalyst of proliferation.
The U.S. should also conclude a SALT Treaty with the Soviets that
really is an arms limitation agreement, not a disguised vertical
proliferation. And the U.S. should resist attempts to make the
permanent Security Council members a nuclear "club" by elevating
India's status or that of any future nuclear proliferator.
75. Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons: Final Declaration. 14 International Legal Materials 1061, 1068-69
<19751.
76. Boskey, B., and Willrich, M., eds. Nuclear Proliferation: Prospects for Control.
The Dunellen Company, Inc., New York, 1970, at 122.
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Unfortunately, there are conflicting goals at stake here. Deemphasizing nuclear strength may lead to proliferation among
countries such as West Germany that feel that allied nuclear
capability is their only buffer between them and a coventional or
nuclear attack. Inadequate political clout may even induce certain
states to become or remain non-signatories to the NPT. And, in light
of current capacity by states other than the United States to supply
nuclear technology and equipment, the United States may have
already passed the peak of its influence on the political motivations of
possible proliferators.
The final policy implications concern the rerouting of economic
advantages to proliferation. Subtle methods toward this goal include
development of nuclear reactors and other processing technology that
neutralize any economic advantages of complete self-sustaining forms
of nuclear energy production. Renewable forms such as solar energy
and hydroelectric power must be pursued and developed, and made
economically attractive to non-nuclear states. International control
and management of the fuel cycle should also be encouraged. Reactors
and plants can be designed to make plutonium extraction more
difficult, costly and time-consuming.
A more direct approach is to link economic assistance to NPT
adherence. The U.S. is so far clearly unwilling to pursue this route,
because of mutual economic interdependence and possible retaliation
by the affected countries. However, this step may be reserved for
major transgressors, and even non-parties, to the NPT. The U.S. must
take notice of the fact demonstrated by India's nuclear explosion: that
as a byproduct of a peaceful nuclear program, weapons development
need not be expensive. Economic sanctions should be available after
the fact of proliferation by a state, but must be definite enough before
the fact to act as a deterrent.
There are no cut and dried solutions to the prosped of proliferation. There are so many contingencies that cannot readily be brought
under control and whose outcomes are too speculative to anticipate. A
flexible policy with inflexible goals will be needed in the future to
cope successfully with the complex and uncertain developments
concerning nuclear weapons proliferation. As President Carter has
noted, "the world is waiting, but not necessarily for long." 77

77. Carter, J., Three steps toward nuclear responsibility. Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists 28, 32 (January, 1977).

PoLicY, PRoLIFERATION AND THE

NPT

45

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Treaties
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1 July 1968
[1970]. UST 483, T.I.A.S. #6839.
International Documents
A!Res/1965 (XVI) Dec. 5, 1961; Documents on Disarmament, 1961 at
694.
A!Res/2153A (XXI) Jan. 4, 1966; Documents on Disarmament, 1966,
at 721.
A/Res/2372 (XXII), U.N. Doc. A/7016/Add. 1 at 5, June 10, 1968.
A!Res/1722 (XVI), 16 U.N. GAOR 1129, Jan. 3, 1962; Documents on
Disarmament, 1962, at 741.
Statement by Ambassador Trivedi, ENDC/PV 314, July 18, 1967, at
5.
Statement by Soviet Union Representative to ENDC, ENDC/PV 241,
February 17, 1966, at 24-33.
United Nations Security Council Resolution on Security Assurances.
S/RES/255 (XXII), June 19, 1968.
U.S. Government Documents
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 2014 et. seq.
(1964).
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Facts on
Nuclear Proliferation, for the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, 94th Congress, 1st Session (1975).
Hearings on Executive H (The Non-Proliferation Treaty) before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th Congress, 1st and 2nd
Sessions (Part 1, 1968).
Hearings on the Military Implications of the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, before the Senate Committee on
Armed Services, 91st Congress, 1st Session (1969).
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, 22 U.S.C. § 3201-3282 (1978).
Office of Technology Assessment Report on Nuclear Proliferation
Safeguards: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear
Proliferation, and Federal Services of the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, 95th Congress, 1st Session (1977).
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Exec. Rep. No.9,
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (1968).

46

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STuDIES SERIES

Books
Boskey, B., and Willrich, M., eds. Nuclear Proliferation: Prospects for
Control. The Dunellen Company, Inc., New York, 1970.
Guhin, M. Nuclear Paradox: Security Risks of the Peaceful Atom.
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research in
Foreign Affairs, 1976.
Kapur, A. International Nuclear Proliferation: Multilateral Diplomacy
and Regional Aspects. Praeger Publishers, New York, 1979.
Khan, M. Nuclear Energy and International Co-operation: A Third
World Perception of the Erosion of Confidence. The Rockefeller
Foundation/The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London,
1979.
Martin, A. Legal Aspects of Disarmament. The British Institute of
International and Comparative Law, London, 1963.
Pakistan Yearbook 1973. Karachi National Publication House, Ltd.,
1974.
International study will rebuff U.S. bid to block spread of nuclear
technology. Wall Street Journal, January 16, 1980, at 5, col. 1.
Kapur, A. Nth powers of the future. 430 Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science84-95 (March 1977).
Khalilzad, Z. Pakistan: the making of a nuclear power. 16 Asian
Survey 580-592 (1976).
New York Times, March 14, 1980, at A 7, col. 1.
Review conference of the parties to the treaty on non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons: final declaration. 14 International Legal Materials 1061-1067 (1974).
Ribicoff, A. A market-sharing approach to the world nuclear sales
problem. 54 Foreign Affairs 764-787 (July 1976).
Thayer, F. Proliferation and the future: destruction or transformation? 430 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 133-151 (March 1977).
Wohlstetter, A. Spreading the bomb without quite breaking the
rules. 25 Foreign Policy 88-99 (1977).
Wonder, E. Nuclear commerce and proliferation: Germany and
Brazil, 1975. 21 Orbis 277-303 (1977).
Speeches
Address by Bernard M. Baruch to the United Nations Atomic Energy
Commission (June 14, 1946), reprinted in Reader on Nuclear
Non-Proliferation, prepared for the Subcommittee on Energy,
Nuclear Proliferation and Federal Services of the Senate Committee
on Governmental Affairs, 95th Congress, 2nd Session (1978).

PoLICY, PRoLIFERATION AND THE NPT

47

Address by Dwight D. Eisenhower to the United Nations General
Assembly (December 8, 1953), reprinted in Reader on Nuclear
Non-Proliferation, prepared for the Subcommittee on Energy,
Nuclear Proliferation, and Federal Services of the Senate Committee
on Governmental Affairs, 95th Congress, 2nd Session <1978l.
Address by Joseph S. Nye at the Uranium Institute (July 12, 1978J,
reprinted in Reader on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, prepared for the
Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Federal Services of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 95th
Congress, 2nd Session (1978).

Articles
Barnaby, F. How states can "go nuclear". 430 Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 29-48 (March 1977).
Carter, J. Three steps toward nuclear responsibility. Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists 28-41 (January 1977).
Dougherty, J. The treaty and the non-nuclear states. 11 Orbis
360-377 (1967).
The draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: a critical
appraisal. 8 Indian Journal of International Law 223-235 (1968).
Dunn, L. Nuclear proliferation and world politics. 430 Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 96-116 (March
1977).
Epstein, W. Why states go- and don't go- nuclear [430 Annals of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 16-28
<March 1977).
Franko, L. U.S. regulation of the spread of nuclear technologies
through supplier power: lever or boomerang? 10 Law and Policy in
International Business 1181-1204 (1979).
Gleissner, J. Recent U.S. efforts to control nuclear proliferation. 10
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 271-290 (1977).
Goldschmidt, B. A historical survey of non-proliferation policies. 2(1 J
International Security 69-87 (summer 1977).
International study will rebuff U.S. bid to block spread of nuclear
technology. Wall Street Journal, January 16, 1980, at 5, col. 1.
Kapur, A. Nth powers of the future. 430 Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 84-95 <March 1977).
Khalilzad, Z. Pakistan: the making of a nuclear power. 16 Asian
Survey 580-592 (1976).
New York Times, March 14, 1980, at A7, col. 1.
Review conference of the parties to the treaty on non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons: final declaration. 14 International Legal Materials 1061-1067 (1974).

48

CoNTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

Ribicoff, A. A market-sharing approach to the world nuclear sales
problem. 54 Foreign Affairs 764-787 (July 1976).
Thayer, F. Proliferation and the future: destruction of transformation? 430 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 133-151 (March 1977).
Wall Street Journal, March 24, 1980, at 23, col. 8.
Wohlstetter, A. Spreading the bomb without quite breaking the rules.
25 Foreign Policy 88-99 (1977).
Wonder, E. Nuclear commerce and proliferation: Germany and Brazil,
1975. 21 Orbis 277-303 (1977).

Speeches
Address by Bernard M. Baruch to the United Nations Atomic Energy
Commission (June 14, 1946), reprinted in Reader on Nuclear
Non-Proliferation, prepared for the Subcommittee on Energy,
Nuclear Proliferation and Federal Services of the Senate Committee
on Governmental Affairs, 95th Congress, 2nd Session (1978).
Address by Dwight D. Eisenhower to the United Nations General
Assembly (December 8, 1953), reprinted in Reader on Nuclear
Non-Proliferation, prepared for the Subcommittee on Energy,
NuClear Proliferation, and Federal Services of the Senate Committee
on Governmental Affairs, 95th Congress, 2nd Session (1978).
Address by Joseph S. Nye at the Uranium Institute (July 12, 1978),
reprinted in Reader on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, prepared for the
Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Federal Services of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 95th
Congress, 2nd Session (1978).

APPENDIX I

50

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SEHIES

61

17

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the
"Parties to the Treaty",
Considering the devastation that would be vislted upon all mankind
by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every erfort to avert
the danger or such a var and to take measures to safeguard the security
or peoples,
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons vould seriously
enhance the danger of nuclear war,
In conformity vith resolutions of the United Nations General \•sembly
calling tor the

~onclusion

of an agreement on theprevention ot

~~~~

dis-

semination of nuclear weapons.

Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Enel'gy Agency safeguards on peacerul nuclear activities,
Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts
to further the application, vithin the framework of the International Atomic
Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively
the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments
and other techniques at certain strategic points,
Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of
nuclear technology,

in~luding

any technological by-products vhich may be

derived by nuclear-veapon States from the development of nuclear explosive
devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the
Treaty, whether nuclear-veapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,
on the Non-Proliferation of Atomic Weapons, 1 July 1968 [1970].
T.I.A.S. 16839.

77 Treaty
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Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the
Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other
States to, the fUrther development of the applications of atomic energy for
peaceful purposes,
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the
cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in
the direction of nuclear disarmament,
Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,
Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty
banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere in outer space and under
water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test
explosions

~~

nuclear

w;a~ons

for all time and to continue

ne~:~iations

to

this end,
Desiring to fUrther the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the
manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and
the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control.
Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace
and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments. of
the vorld's h1mmn and economic resources,
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Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer
to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weaponR or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclearweapon State to manufacture or othervise acquire uuclear weapons or other

nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.
ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to
receive the transfer from any t:·ansferor vhatsoever of nuclear weap.::.ns or

other nuclear explosive devices

o~

of

~antral

over such weapons or explo-

sive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise
acquire nuclear veapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek
or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other

nuclear explosive devices.
ARTICLE III

1.

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to

accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiBted and concluded
with the International Atomic Energy A6ency in accordance with the Statute
of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards systec,
for the exclusive purpose or verification or the fulfillment or its obligation• assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Procedures for the safeguards

required by this article shall be followed vith respect to source or special
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enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation
of negotiations.
ARTICLE IV

1.

Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the in-

alienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes vithout discrimination and in conformity vith articles I and II of this Treaty.
2.

All Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the

right to participate in, the fUllest possible exchange of equipment,
materials and scientific and technological information for the peacefUl uses
of nuclear energy.

Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also

cooperate in contributing alone or together vith other States or international
organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear
enPrgy for peace.t'Ul purposes., espe:cially ii1 the tt::rri tc.ries at" non-nucleat·-

veapon States Party to the Treaty, vith due consideration for the needs of
the developing areas of the vorld.
ARTICLE V
Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to
ensure that, in accordance vith this Treaty, under appropriate international
observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential
benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions vill be made
available to non-nuclear-veapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used
vill be as lov as possible and exclude any charge for research and development.
Ron-nuclear-veapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such
benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements,·through
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fissionable material vhether it is being produced, processed or used in any
principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility.

The safeguards

required by this article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable
material in all peaceful nuclear activities vithin the territory of such
State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anyvhere.
2.

Each State Party to the Treaty underto.kes not to provide:

(a)

source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especiallY
designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special
fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-veapon State for peaceful purposes,
unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the
safeguards required by this article.
3.

The

safe~Jards

required by this ar.icle shall be implemented in a

manner designeil to c.:>mp1Y vith article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid
hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including
the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or

prod~.:ction

of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in

accordance vith the provisions or this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.
4,

Non-nuclear-veapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agree-

ments vith the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements
of this article either individually or together vith other States in
vith the Statuteof the International Atomic Energy Agency.

acco~dance

Negotiation of

such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into
force of this Treaty.

For States depositing their instruments of ratification

or accession after the 160-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall
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G.n appropriate international body vith adequate

weapon States.

reprcsentat.~0n

of ncm-nuelca.r-

Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as

possible after the Treaty enters into force.

lion-nuclear-weapon States Party

to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral
agreements.
ARTICLE VI
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in
good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms
race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general
and complete disarmament under strict and

effe.~tive

international control.

ARTICLE VII
Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to con<:ll.1e regional treaties in order to assurP the tot•l absence or auclear
weapo~

in their respective territories.
ARTICLE VIII

1.

Any

Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty.

The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary
Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty.

There-

upon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the
Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they
shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.
2.

Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority or the

votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclearweapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date
the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board or Governors or the
International Atomic Energy Agency.

The amendment shall enter into force
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for

ea~h

Party that

d~ro~its

itn instrument of ratification of the amend-

ment upon the deposit of such instruments of r'<tification b•· a mujority of
all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon
States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties vhich, on the date

th~ ~~end

ment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International
Atomic Energy Agency.

Thtreafter, it shall enter into force for any other

Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.
3 •. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference
of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to
review the operation

o~his

Treaty vith a viev of assuring that the purposes

of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized.

At

intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty
may obtain, by 01•bmitting a proposal to this effect t.:> the Depositary Governll'ents, the

con~ening

of further conferences vith the same objective of re-

viewing the operation of the Treaty
ARTICLE IX
1.

This

~eaty

shall be open to all States for signature.

Any State

vhich does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance vitb
paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.
2.

This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States.

Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited
vith the Goverr.ments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
vhich are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.
3.

This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the

States, the Governments of vhich are designated Depositaries of the Treaty,

57

PoLICY, PROLIFERATION AND THE NPT

68

and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instrumt>nts of ratification.

For the purposes of thb Treaty, a nuclear-weapon

State is one vhich has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other
nuclear explosive device prior to Junuary 1, 1967.

4.

For States vhose instruments of ratification or accession are de-

posited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter
into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or

aecession.

5.

The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory

and seceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit or
each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into
force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening
a conference or other notices.

6.

This Treaty ~hal! be registered by the Dei-:>Sitary Governments purst!<:nt

to article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
ARTICLE X
1.

Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the

right to vithdrav from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events,
relat~d

to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme

interests of its country.

It shall give notice or such vithdraval to all

other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three
months in advance.

Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary

events it regards as having
2.

j~opardized

its supreme interests.

Tventy-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a con-

ference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force
indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or

p~riods.
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This decision shall be taken by a

~Jority

of the Parties to the Treaty.

ARTICLE XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian,

Fr~nch,

Spanish and Chinese .exts

of vhich are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the
Depositary Governments.

Duty certified copies of this Treaty shall be trans-

mitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signator;·
and acceding States.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duty authorized, have signed this
Treaty.
DONE in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscov,
this first day of July ~e thousand nine hundred sixty-eight.

APPENDIX II

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

1

1

1

60

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIEs SERIES

n"

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
ON SECURITY ASSURJ\IIt:ES

Th~ s~ckrity

Noting

wit~

Council,
appreciation the desire of a large number of States to sub-

scribe to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and thereby
to undertake not to receive the

transf~r

from any transferor whatsoever or

nuclear veapons or other nulcear explosive devices or of control over such
weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or
otherwis~

acquire nuclear veapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not

to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices,

Taking into consideration the concern of certain of these States that,
1.•.:onjunctiou .tith their adherenc" to the Tre""Y .on the Non-Proliferation nr

Nuclear Weapons, appropriate measures be undert!\ken t•J safeguard their security,
B~ng

in mind that any aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear

we a polls would endanger the peace and security of all States,
1.

Recognizes that aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such

aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a situation in
which the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent
members, would have to act immediately in accordance vith their obligations
under the United Nations Charter;
2.

Welcomes the intention expressed by certain States that they will

provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance vith the Charter, to
any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the llon-Proli ferat ion or
Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act or an object or a threat of,aggression
Resolution on

S~curit

Assurances.

S/RES/

PoLicY, PRoLIFERATION AND THE

in

vhi~h

3.

NPT

nuclear venpon5 are used;

Reaffirms in particular the inherent right, recot;nized under Article

51 or the Charter, of individual and collective self-defense it an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace ar.d security.
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